Abstract. We study diffusion of cooperation in an n-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves n random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a prisoner's dilemma, where each player can choose a continuous decision variable associated with the probability of cooperating or defecting. We turn the game into a positive dynamical system. Then, we propose a novel strategy that is the saturation of a polynomial function. The strategy requires to each player exclusively the knowledge of her/his own current average payoff, along with her/his own payoffs in the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria; no information about other players' payoffs is required. The proposed strategy guarantees local stability of the cooperative equilibrium if the degree p of the polynomial is greater than or equal to 2. Conversely, the noncooperative equilibrium becomes unstable, for p large enough, if and only if a certain Metzler matrix depending on the payoffs has a positive Frobenius eigenvalue. We prove that the n-dimensional box of all payoffs between the noncooperative and the cooperative ones is positively invariant. Finally we show that, for p large, the domain of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium inside this box becomes arbitrarily close to the box itself.
1. Introduction. Diffusion of cooperation in society is a core topic at the intersection between engineering and social science. A common paradigmatic model is the repeated prisoner's dilemma, for which a variety of versions exist. Starting from Smale's definition of good strategies in [44] , the evolution of cooperation strategies has been first studied within the framework of asymptotic pseudotrajectories in chain recurrent flows [11] . In a subsequent work, the same game has been discussed in the context of stochastic approximation and differential inclusions [10] . There, as well as in [9] , connections with approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs [13] have also been discussed in detail (an overview is provided below). A common assumption in [9, 10, 11] is that the decision of each player is based on the knowledge of the whole current average payoff vector. Differently, [32] introduces a simple adaptive rule that, as shown by simulations, yields convergence to the cooperative equilibrium without requiring any knowledge about the mutual dependence of players' payoffs.
Blackwell's approachability theorem provides conditions for a set to be approachable. The present paper links to approachability insofar as the players interact repeatedly and adjust their strategies based on the current time-average vector payoff, saturated strategy. Section 9 provides concluding comments and directions for future work.
2. The \bfitn -player game. In the considered prisoner's dilemma with n players, each player decides either to cooperate or to defect in order to maximize her/his own payoff. The average payoff vector [x 1 x 2 . . . x n ]
\top evolves according to a repeated game, depending on the players' choice. The decision variable associated with player k is denoted by \omega k \in \{ 0, 1\} , where \bullet \omega k = 1 means that player k cooperates; \bullet \omega k = 0 means that player k defects. Then, the payoff function for player k, resulting from the decision of all the players, is given by \phi (k) (\omega 1 , \omega 2 , . . . , \omega n ) > 0.
Since the game is repeated, the outcome is filtered over time. This corresponds to considering a mixed strategy, namely, a continuous decision variable in the interval , then player k cooperates half of the times s/he is involved in a play. In the case of a population, this number reflects the inclination of the individuals towards cooperation.
Given the instantaneous payoff \phi k of player k, we can define its average payoff over the time interval (0, \tau ] as
In principle, the evolution of this variable would lead to an equation that is not time homogeneous. However, following [45] , we can denote the final time as \tau = e t and, with a change of variables, obtain a homogeneous equation for x k (e t ): \. x k (t) = - x k (t) + \phi k (t). The variable change does not affect the average computation; only the interval is changed (see [45] for a derivation). Moreover, since the strategies we consider are memoryless, they are not affected by time scaling.
In what follows, for brevity, we will denote by x k (t) the (average) payoff of player k, obtained by averaging the instantaneous payoff \phi k (t) over the time interval (0, e t ]. The payoff x k (t) of player k evolves over time according to the equation where the sum is extended to all Boolean choices \omega = (\omega 1 , \omega 2 , . . . , \omega n ) \in \Omega = \{ 0, 1\} n . For instance, if all the players cooperate, then we have u k 1 = 1 and u k 0 = 0 for all k, and the payoffs satisfy the equation [45] \. x k = - x k + \phi (k) (1, 1, . . . , 1).
In this case, the players converge to the cooperative equilibrium point, which is \= x k = \phi (k) ( , . . . \omega n ).
(b) Conversely, defection advantages the traitor: for all k and for any choice of the \omega i , with i \not = k,
(c) For all players, full cooperation is more profitable than full noncooperation:
We consider a decentralized strategy in which each player knows in advance \bullet her/his own payoff in the fully cooperative case, \alpha k . = \phi (k) (1, 1, . . . , 1); \bullet her/his own payoff in the fully noncooperative case, \delta k . = \phi (k) (0, 0, . . . , 0). Note that \alpha k > \delta k for all k, in view of Assumption 1(c).
We consider a repeated continuous-time game with the following rules. \bullet At each time instant, each player adopts a memoryless strategy exclusively depending on her/his own payoff x k (t):
\bullet Each player ignores the actions of the other players. \bullet Each player ignores the payoff functions of the other players. \bullet All players act continuously in time, selecting at each time instant the strategy u k 1 (t), and u k 0 (t) = 1 -u k 1 (t), subject to the constraints 0 \leq u k 1 (t) \leq 1 and 0 \leq u k 0 (t) \leq 1. The rationale is that, in practical situations of repeated games (such as, for instance, the transmission problem discussed in section 8.2), an overall cross-surveillance among players is impossible. Each player must decide whether to cooperate based on the evaluation of her/his own payoff only. Variables u k 1 (t) (respectively, u k 0 (t)) represent the probability of cooperating (respectively, noncooperating). In a practical context where the decisions are associated with discrete events, this would roughly correspond to the fraction of times when the player cooperates in a small interval \Delta t. Remark 1. Although u k 1 (t) and u k 0 (t) could be regarded as probabilities, we are considering a purely deterministic problem. This is different in nature from the case of stochastic dynamic games (see [41] ).
Define the functions
where p is a positive integer and sat [0, 1] is the saturation function: 
Remark 2. For each player, the proposed strategy is exclusively based on her/his own average payoff (x k (t)) and on her/his own payoff in the fully cooperative (\alpha k ) and fully noncooperative (\delta k ) cases; no information about the other players is required. If the current average payoff of a player is lower than expected (which must be due to noncooperation of some other players), then s/he can decide to stop cooperating, without any actual knowledge of the decision/strategy of the other players. For instance, consider m vendors who agree on a fair common price for their product (which would result in a certain average profit for each of them, based on an expected demand); if one vendor decides to secretly break the deal and lower the price to attract more customers, then the other vendors see their current cumulative profit decrease with respect to their expectation and, based on this information only, they can decide, in turn, to reduce the price (up to the minimum level) to contrast the negative trend. As we will show, the proposed strategy allows a player to properly react to noncooperation, even without having any explicit knowledge of the other players and of their strategies. Parameter p has a fundamental role and represents patience: p = 1 induces a linear reaction to values of x k that are smaller than \alpha k , while p = 2 induces a weaker quadratic reaction, and so on.
In this framework, our main goal is to establish which values of the payoffs and of the patience parameter p lead to cooperation, given the proposed strategy. \top , \omega = (\omega 1 , \omega 2 , . . . , \omega n ), and \Phi (\omega ) = [\phi (1) (\omega ) \phi (2) (\omega ) . . . \phi (n) (\omega )] \top , the dynamical system can be written in vector form as
where \Omega = \{ 0, 1\} n . Denoting by \scrV = conv\{ \Phi (\omega ), \omega \in \Omega \} (3.2) the convex hull of all the 2 n points \Phi (\omega ), with \omega \in \Omega , the following result holds.
Theorem 3.1. The polytope (3.2) is robustly positively invariant and attractive for system (3.1) for any choice of the payoff functions in vector \Phi (\omega ) and for any possible choice of the functions u = \Phi (1, 1)u 
) are nonnegative and sum up to one; hence v is in the convex hull \scrV . Assume that the assertion is true for a given n. If we add a new variable (n + 1), we can write v as v = u Since the two sums are in the convex hull, their convex combination belongs to the convex hull as well. Therefore, the inclusion (3.3) holds for any n. Then, we can write the system as \.
where \scrV is any convex and compact set (in our case, a polytope). We show that \scrV is positively invariant and attractive for this system. Indeed, consider the support functional \psi of \scrV , defined in accordance with [40] , as \psi (z) = max v\in \scrV z \top v. Then \scrV = \{ v \in \BbbR n : z \top v \leq \psi (z) for all z \in \BbbR n \} . Consider the function \zeta = z \top x with z \not = 0 arbitrary. Since, for all v \in \scrV , it is z \top v \leq \psi (z) for any z, then \.
Necessarily we have lim sup t\rightar\infty \zeta \leq \psi (z) for all z; hence any trajectory x(t) converges to the set \scrV , and this proves that \scrV is attractive. Also, in view of the differential inequality \.
\zeta \leq - \zeta +\psi (z) derived above, the actual trajectory is bounded as \zeta (t) \leq \= \zeta (t), where \= \zeta (t) is the solution of \. \= \zeta = -\= \zeta + \psi (z), which monotonically converges to \psi (z). Therefore, if z \top x(t 0 ) \leq \psi (z) for any z (hence, x(t 0 ) \in \scrV ), then z \top x(t) \leq \psi (z) for any z (hence, x(t) \in \scrV ) for all t \geq t 0 . This proves the positive invariance of the set \scrV .
Theorem 3.1 entails the following result, which will be crucial in assessing whether the strategy is good (cf. Definition 6.1 in section 6).
Corollary 3.2. If n -r players defect (namely, u k \omega k = 0 for k = r + 1, . . . , n), then the trajectory x(t) of system (3.1) converges to the convex hull of the 2 r points \Phi (\omega 1 , \omega 2 , . . . , \omega r , 0, . . . , 0) with \omega i \in \{ 0, 1\} for all i = 1, . . . , r.
The next corollary ensures that the overall system is positive, namely, that the positive orthant is a positively invariant set for the system, regardless of the chosen strategy and payoff functions. 
4. Stability analysis of cooperative and noncooperative equilibria. In this section, the results in [21] are generalized to the n-dimensional case. First we show that, when the proposed strategy is adopted with p \geq 2, the cooperative point is a robustly stable equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. For any choice of the payoff functions, the cooperative point \= x = \Phi (1, . . . , 1), namely \= x k = \alpha k for all k, is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3.1) with strategy (2.4), provided that p \geq 2.
Proof. If \= x k = \alpha k , then \sigma k (\= x k ) = 0 and u k 1 = 1 for all k. Therefore, only one term in the sum survives and the system equation becomes
hence \=
x is an equilibrium point. To prove its stability, since the function \sigma k (x k ) with p \geq 2 is continuously differentiable at x k = \alpha k , we can apply a linearization criterion. Downloaded 12/18/18 to 129.125.136.103. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php
We have seen that \sigma k (\alpha k ) = 0. By differentiating \sigma k (x k ) with respect to x k , we have
which is also zero at x k = \alpha k . Therefore, the derivative of all the terms
is zero at x k = \alpha k and the Jacobian at the cooperative equilibrium is J = - I, where I is the identity matrix. This implies local asymptotic stability.
Also the noncooperative point is an equilibrium, whose instability can be ensured under suitable assumptions, since a player moving away from the noncooperative equilibrium increases the payoffs of all other players.
Before stating this result, we need to show the invariance of the hyper-rectangle
Proposition 4.2. The hyper-rectangle \scrR \delta ,\alpha is positively invariant for system (3.1) with strategy (2.4).
Proof. We show that \.
x i \geq 0 when x i = \delta i , while \. x i \leq 0 when x i = \alpha i . This implies positive invariance of \scrR \delta ,\alpha [15, 16] .
Let us consider the game from the standpoint of player 1. Since the cooperation of other players is profitable by assumption, the payoff of player 1 in the fully noncooperative case is \delta 1 = \phi (1) (0, 0, . . . , 0) \leq \phi (1) (0, \omega 2 , . . . , \omega n ), while in the fully cooperative case it is \alpha 1 = \phi (1) (1, 1, . . . , 1) \geq \phi (1) (1, \omega 2 , . . . , \omega n ). If x 1 = \delta 1 , then player 1 is not cooperating, namely, \omega 1 = 0; hence u \.
If x 1 = \alpha 1 , player 1 is cooperating, namely, \omega 1 = 1; hence u \.
The same argument can be repeated for all players, and this completes the proof.
We are now ready to introduce a result on the attractiveness of \scrR \delta ,\alpha . \.
Since the derivative is positive, \= x 1 (t) converges to its limit \= x 1 (\infty ) from below. If we assume by contradiction that \= x 1 (\infty ) < \delta 1 , then the above expression for the derivative ensures that lim inf t\rightar\infty \.
x 1 (t) \geq \delta 1 - \= x 1 for all \= x 1 < \delta 1 ; however, this is in contradiction with x 1 (t) \rightar \= x 1 (\infty ) < \delta 1 . The case \= x 1 > \alpha 1 can be handled similarly and, in both cases, the reasoning is the same for all players. Now define the n \times n matrices
and note that, in view of Assumption 1(a), the matrix
, it has nonnegative off-diagonal entries). We remind that the dominant eigenvalue (i.e., the eigenvalue with the largest real part) of a Metzler matrix is real [12, 19] .
These considerations enable us to address the following question: does there exist a panic region, a subset of the polytopic payoff region such that, when starting from a point inside this region, all players feel betrayed and refuse to cooperate? The panic region would hence be the domain of attraction of the noncooperative equilibrium point within the polytopic payoff region. The following result shows that we can prevent the existence of a panic region by choosing p large enough, provided that matrix [M -N ]D - 1 has a positive real eigenvalue. The vanishing of the panic region for large values of p can be linked to the stability of cooperation in multiplayer social dilemmas; see, e.g., [29, page 16428] : in fact, p can be viewed as a behavioral trait parameter that measures the altruistic nature of the players. has a positive real eigenvalue, then the noncooperative equilibrium \x = \Phi (0, . . . , 0) (i.e., \x k = \delta k for all k) is unstable for p large enough.
- 1 has no real positive eigenvalues, then, for any choice of p, the noncooperative equilibrium is locally attractive for all initial conditions x k > \delta k such that x k -\delta k \leq \epsilon for \epsilon > 0 small enough.
Proof. If \x k = \delta k , then \sigma k (\x k ) = 1 and u k 1 = 0, u k 0 = 1 for all k. Hence, the system equation becomes \.
x = - \x + \Phi (0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0, which means that \x is an equilibrium point.
To assess stability, since the saturation function compromises differentiability at \ x (this was not the case for the cooperative point \= x with p \geq 2), we need to consider the right limit of the Jacobian at the noncooperative equilibrium (namely, the limit for x k \rightar \x This expression of the Jacobian is correct if we neglect saturation in the functions \sigma k (x k ). In this case, evaluating the functions without saturation at the point \x gives
for any p. The corresponding derivative is
Now consider the derivative of the term v in (3.
and is associated with the column vector \Phi (0, 0, . . . 0) (which explains the structure of matrix N ). For terms of the type (1 -\sigma k ) \prod n i=1,i\not =k \sigma i , the derivative with respect to x k , computed at the noncooperative equilibrium, is
and is associated with the term \Phi (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), with the 1 in the kth position (which explains the structure of matrix M ), while the other derivatives are zero, because (1 -\sigma k ) is zero at the noncooperative equilibrium.
Under differentiability assumptions, the proof would be completed. Indeed, since
is Metzler as well and has eigenvalues \lambda i = - 1 + p\theta i , where \theta i are the eigenvalues of matrix
If there is a positive \theta i , then J has a positive eigenvalue for p large enough; hence the equilibrium is unstable for such a choice of p.
Yet, to complete the proof, we need to address the issue of the nondifferentiability of the function at \x. Note that the off-diagonal entries of J are strictly positive.
- 1 has a positive real eigenvalue \theta . Let \eta be the left Frobenius eigenvector associated with the positive Frobenius eigenvalue \lambda = - 1 + p\theta > 0 of J. Then, the inequality \eta > 0 is satisfied componentwise and \eta \top J = \lambda \eta \top . By changing the variables as z k = x k -\delta k , we show that there exists a simplex of the form \scrS \epsilon = \{ z : z k \geq 0 and \eta \top z \leq \epsilon \} such that any solution starting in the interior of \scrS \epsilon reaches the face \eta \top z = \epsilon . This implies that the equilibrium \x (corresponding to z k = 0 for all k) is unstable. To this aim, let us write the system as \. z = Jz + O(z), where O(z) is an infinitesimal of order greater than 1. In view of Proposition 4.2, provided that \epsilon > 0 is small enough to ensure that \scrS \epsilon is inside the hyper-rectangle \scrR \delta ,\alpha , any solution starting in \scrS \epsilon with z(0) > 0 (componentwise) remains positive, because the hyper-rectangle is positively invariant. Now, consider the function \zeta = \eta \top z. Its derivative \. both \lambda > 0 (by assumption) and \zeta = \eta \top z > 0 (because \eta and z are componentwise positive). Hence, the solution reaches the face \eta
- 1 has no positive real eigenvalues, then its dominant Frobenius eigenvalue is negative or zero and, for any p, all the eigenvalues of J have a negative real part. Hence, J is Hurwitz stable for all p. With the same argument as above, based on a simplex, we can prove attractivity of the noncooperative equilibrium starting from all initial conditions z k (0) positive and small enough.
Remark 3. Even when the noncooperative equilibrium is unstable, it admits a nontrivial region where trajectories converge to it. This is a distrust region (cf. Figure 1 ), characterized by low values of the payoffs:
For any initial condition in the distrust region \scrD , all the functions \sigma k (x k ) are saturated, \sigma k (x k ) = 1; hence no one cooperates: u \.
If the noncooperative equilibrium is not stable, then an``escape region"" is of the form x k > \delta k for all k, according to the proof of Theorem 4.4.
5. Dynamics in the hyper-rectangle \bfscrR \bfitalp,\bfitdel . As shown in Proposition 4.3, the hyper-rectangle \scrR \alpha ,\delta is attractive for the system. A related issue to investigate is then the behavior of the system when the state is inside \scrR \alpha ,\delta . We will prove that, for p sufficiently large, the domain of attraction to the cooperative point inside the positively invariant hyper-rectangle \scrR \alpha ,\delta (the dashed rectangle in Figure 1 ) gets arbitrarily close to \scrR \alpha ,\delta . Therefore, even when the noncooperative equilibrium is stable, its domain of attraction \scrS \epsilon (defined in the proof Theorem 4.4) gets smaller and smaller as p increases.
To simplify the notation, we consider the change of coordinates
which maps \scrR \alpha ,\delta into the hyper-cube \scrC = \{ \xi \in \BbbR n : 0 \leq \xi k \leq 1 \forall k = 1, . . . , n\} . For any positive 0 < \lambda < 1, there exists p \lambda such that the state converges to the cooperative point \xi = 0 for any initial condition \xi (0) \in \scrC \lambda and for all p \geq p \lambda .
Proof. The equations (2.1), (2.3), and (2.4) in the new variable \xi become 
Since \xi = 0 is an equilibrium, the constant term of the polynomial is zero, \mu 0,0...,0 = 0, and indeed \\alpha k = \\phi (k) (1, 1, . . . , 1). The equation above holds for all \xi in the set \scrC , which is invariant, since it is the transformed set of \scrR \alpha ,\delta . To prove convergence for all initial states in \scrC \lambda , we introduce the copositive Lyapunov function V (\xi ) . = max i\in \{ 1,...,n\} \xi i . The set \scrC \lambda is defined by 0 \leq V (\xi ) \leq \lambda . Define the maximizer set as the set of indices where the maximum is achieved: \scrM (\xi ) = \{ i : \xi i = V (\xi )\} . Then, the Lyapunov derivative of V can be written in accordance with [16] as \.
V (\xi ) = max k\in \scrM (x) \. \xi k . We show that, for p large enough, \.
V (\xi ) is negative in \scrC \lambda for any \lambda < 1: if \xi \in \scrC \lambda and k \in \scrM (\xi ), then
for some positive numbers \nu h . Given \lambda < 1, we can always find p \lambda such that, for all k and all p \geq p \lambda , the polynomial in (5.4) is negative in the set \scrC \lambda , where 0 \leq \xi k \leq \lambda , because the dominant linear term is negative. Hence, for p \geq p \lambda , the Lyapunov derivative of V is negative for V (\xi ) \leq \lambda , V (\xi ) \not = 0, as long as \xi \in \scrC \lambda . Since the hyper-cube \scrC is invariant, the proof is completed.
Remark 4. When p tends to infinity, it squashes down the function \sigma k (x k ) to zero for all x k \in (\delta k , \alpha k ], which means that the player k is numb to noncooperation of others and cooperates. 
However, an open-loop strategy is not satisfactory because it makes the players blind to defection of others: adopting a feedback strategy is fundamental, because it allows the players to monitor the actions of others (even though indirectly, by monitoring the evolution of their own payoffs) and react to betrayals. For this reason, we are particularly interested in finite values of p: it is always possible to find a finite value of p that ensures convergence to the cooperative point, and at the same time keeps all players sufficiently aware of the context and able to react if needed. Indeed, the proposed strategy is conceived so that each player, exclusively based on its own payoff, can enforce a retaliation against betrayal. This crucial aspect is analyzed in the next section.
We conclude the section pointing out that, instead of the considered strategy, we could consider the more general class of sigmoidal functions, which (a) are continuous and strictly decreasing in the interval (\delta k , \alpha k ); (b) have a single inflexion point; (c) satisfy \sigma (\alpha k ) = 0, \sigma (\delta k ) = 1, \sigma \prime (\alpha k ) = \sigma \prime (\delta k ) = 0; and (d) are constant outside (\delta k , \alpha k ) and, respectively equal to 0 for x k \geq \alpha k and to 1 for
, with \xi k defined as in (5.1) and q and p positive integers, could be one of such functions. Remarkably, in the case of a sigmoidal function we would have no hope of destabilizing the noncooperative point. Indeed, since the derivative at the noncooperative point (corresponding to \xi k = 1 for all k) is zero, \sigma \prime (1) = 0, and the linear part of the system is stable, we would always have local stability of the noncooperative equilibrium. Therefore, by properly choosing p and q, we could at most design a sigmoidal function so that, inside the rectangle \scrR \alpha ,\delta , the domain of attraction of the cooperative point is larger than the domain of attraction of the noncooperative point.
A good strategy?
It is interesting to assess whether the proposed strategy is good, according to the next definition.
Definition 6.1. The saturated strategy in (2.4) is good if no player benefits from abandoning the strategy and choosing u k 0 (steady noncooperation). We assume that if at least one player does not cooperate, then all other players benefit from full noncooperation. Assumption 2. If \omega i = 0 for some indices i \in \scrI , then
, . . . \omega n ) for all k / \in \scrI . \diamond Theorem 6.2. Given system (3.1) under Assumption 2, if one of the players defects and the others adopt the strategy (2.4), then for any choice of p the system converges to the noncooperative equilibrium: x k = \delta k for all k.
Proof. If player 1 defects, then, in view of Corollary 3.2, x(t) converges to the convex hull of the points \Phi (0, \omega 2 , . . . , \omega n ). If player k does not defect, due to Assumption 2, her/his payoff x k (t) decreases to values below \delta k : lim sup t\rightar\infty x k (t) \leq \phi (k) (0, 0, . . . , 0) = \delta k . On the other hand, when x k \leq \delta k , the strategy saturates to \sigma k (\delta k ) = 1 for any p. Therefore, asymptotically, \.
x = - x + \phi (k) (0, 0, . . . , 0), which yields x k (t) \rightar \delta k for all k.
Hence, the saturated strategy (2.4) is good. Remarkably, the players have no information beyond their own current payoff x k and their own \alpha k and \delta k : their reaction against the defector relies on this knowledge only. Downloaded 12/18/18 to 129.125.136.103. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php 7. A population-game perspective. Let us consider a random player i playing against a random player j, and let player i's payoff matrix be
The above entries represent the payoff of player i when both players cooperate (\alpha ), player i only defects (\beta ), player j only defects (\gamma ), and both players defect (\delta ). Player i chooses the row, while player j chooses the column. The matrix of player j is symmetric and can be ignored. Assumption 1 leads to the payoff ordering \beta > \alpha > \delta > \gamma . (7.2) Let the distribution of cooperators and defectors in the population be u 1 (x) and u 0 (x), respectively, where u 1 + u 0 = 1 with u 1 , u 0 \geq 0, and consider the mixed strategy
.
The average payoff across the population at time t is then u(x(t)) \top F u(x(t)). Also, the average payoff across the population and across time, namely, from 0 to t, is \.
Indeed, consider the time-average expected (over opponent's play) payoff defined as
If we rescale the time window using s = e t , take x(t) = \Gamma (e t ) and differentiate with respect to t, we obtain the differential equation (7.3) . Note that, after rescaling the time window, we have
Equation (7.3) is in the same spirit as in Hart and Mas-Colell's paper [25] on continuous-time approachability (with the calculation of the average payoff analogous to the one in (2.1)). Adopting the strategy (2.4), system (7.3) becomes \.
The result in Theorem 4.4 translates into conditions for the diffusion of cooperation in a population of individuals. To see this, consider that, because of the symmetry in the payoff matrices of the game, it holds that
where r . = \alpha -\delta > 0, g . = \delta -\gamma > 0, and l . = \beta -\delta > 0. Conditions for the existence of positive eigenvalues for [M -N ]D - 1 then translate into conditions on the trace and determinant of the above matrix. In particular, we have positive eigenvalues if l > g. This condition means that when a cooperator meets a defector, the damage for the cooperator is less than the benefit for the defector. Under this condition, in a population of``patient"" and``farsighted"" cooperators (this means that p is large enough), the cost of cooperating with defectors is relatively small, and therefore it turns out that all players end up cooperating.
The population scenario suggests a second interpretation of the results if we view p as the number of repeated plays between player i and p different opponents j, assuming that, at each iteration, player i defects with probability (
). If we view the repeated plays as p independent identically distributed experiments, the joint probability of defecting in all p plays (or equivalently, one minus the probability of cooperating at least once out of p plays) is given by
From the invariance of the payoff polytope, the above joint probability is equal to the mixed strategy (2.3). The convergence to the cooperative equilibrium means that every player ends up cooperating with all of her/his p neighbor players. If we imagine a network where the nodes are the players, and we add a link (i, j) any time player i cooperates with player j, we can construct a coevolving network which, in the case of convergence to the cooperative equilibrium, has degree p for each node. Figure 2 depicts three different coevolving networks for p = 5, p = 10, and p = 15. By``co-evolving network"" we mean that the topology of the network evolves together with the probability of cooperation. In this context, the probability of cooperation between any two players determines the probability of forming a link between the corresponding nodes. Thus, Figure 2 displays the steady-state topology configuration when all players cooperate with probability 1 and each player has 5, 10, or 15 neighbors.
Remark 5. It is interesting to compare the proposed saturated strategy with replicator dynamics in evolutionary games, where the cooperation frequency in a population increases if the cooperators perform better than the defectors. In particular, the continuous-time replicator dynamics is given by \.
where s is a generic strategy, x s is the portion of the population playing that strategy, \= u(x(t)) is the average payoff across the population, and u(s, x(t)) is the instantaneous payoff obtained by playing s in a population whose strategies are distributed according to x(t). A first difference is that the proposed strategy is a feedback on the current Downloaded 12/18/18 to 129.125.136.103. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php payoff which is averaged over time, while in the replicator dynamics the average across the population is considered but not the average over time. A second difference is that the dynamics (7.3) describes the evolution over time of the average payoff (over time and across the population), while the replicator dynamics captures the dynamics on the portion of cooperators and defectors; therefore, the two dynamics model different quantities (the payoff in one case, the portion of cooperators/defectors in the other). A third difference is that, in our case, the portion of cooperators increases or decreases based on the current average payoff over time and across the population, while in the replicator dynamics the instantaneous payoff obtained from cooperating is compared with the average payoff across the population. Hence, although the idea of averaging across the population is a common point, it plays a different role in the two cases. To investigate stability, let us consider the matrix which becomes unstable with a strictly positive eigenvalue when p > 2; hence, D becomes unstable. We simulate the system for p = 3: for this value of the parameter that captures the patience of the players, D becomes unstable and, as expected, the proposed saturated strategy guarantees convergence to the cooperative equilibrium for all trajectories originating in the invariant payoff polygon having vertices (4.5, 4), (0.5, 4.5), (1.5, 2), and (6, 1). Some trajectories originating from low initial payoffs for both players still converge to the noncooperative equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 3 , right. For details on the 2-player game, the reader is referred to [21] .
Channel sharing in wireless communication.
Wireless communication is an important field to which control theory can provide several contributions, for instance, to control how a wireless channel is shared among several transmitters (see, e.g., [14] and the references therein); the main problem is to maximize transmission while avoiding congestion problems. Consider the case of frequency division multiple access, in which the radio frequency channel is split into several smaller subchannels, each with its own frequency range and allocated to a single transmitter only. Problems may arise due to greedy transmitters that start using more subchannels than the allocated one: this leads to degradation of the success rate in transmission for all messages that are sent using a subchannel that is used by more than one transmitter (we call this phenomenon congestion for simplicity). In terms of quantity of messages that are successfully sent, all transmitters have lower performance in the case of full congestion (each transmitter uses the whole bandwidth) than in the ideal situation (each transmitter uses its allocated subchannel only). On the other hand, a single transmitter can see its performance definitely improve if it unilaterally decides to use more subchannels while all others use their assigned subchannel only.
A game-theoretic approach to this problem is very popular (surveys are, for instance, [6, 22] ). Adopting the paradigm in [6, Example 2 and Figure 4 ], we can distinguish between two transmission modes for each transmitter. 0: Broadband: Noncooperation. This selfish transmission mode (using the whole bandwidth instead of the assigned subchannel) would benefit a single transmitter that adopts it, but would cause performance degradation for the others and rapidly cause congestion (typically due to conflicts caused by simultaneous packet transmission [14] ) if adopted by several transmitters.
1: Narrowband: Cooperation. In this transmission mode, each transmitter uses exclusively the subchannel assigned by a network supervisor to optimize the channel. This leads to a fair and efficient transmission.
For the n-transmitter problem, all the conditions in Assumption 1 are verified: (a) is met because the cooperation of transmitter h is more profitable than noncooperation for all other transmitters (there is less congestion); (b) is verified, because a transmitter that uses more bandwidth than the assigned subchannel is advantaged, if the others stick to their assigned subchannel only; (c) full cooperation is more profitable than full noncooperation, because full congestion induces a severe performance drop.
The problem fits nicely in our setup. Each transmitter can be reasonably assumed to be aware exclusively of the expected performance in the fully cooperative and in the fully noncooperative case, and of the current performance. Hence, our saturated strategy can be employed. The decision variables u k 1 and u k 0 = 1 -u k 1 represent how prone transmitter k is to transmitting in narrowband/broadband mode. (The strategy can be implemented also in a P-persistent transmission scheme by suitably altering the transmission probability; see [14] Given n equal transmitters, consider their payoff in terms of successful transmission rate (typically megabits/sec). If c transmitters cooperate and d = n -c defect, then the unitary payoff will be, respectively,
for the transmitters that cooperate and
for the transmitters that defect, with b > a. Function f (d) represents the performance degradation due to congestion and conflicts. It is a strictly decreasing function, with f (0) = 1, so that full cooperation means an equal performance a/n for all transmitters, and with bf (n) \ll a. This means that, if all transmitters operate in broadband mode, then the individual payoff is strongly reduced for all of them. We assume that, for all d = 0, 1, . . . , n -1, b n f (d + 1) > a n f (d);
hence any single transmitter has the interest to switch to broadband mode (so that d increases by 1) for any fixed decision of the others. We can rewrite the condition as
Remark 6. The knowledge of the function f is not required to implement the saturated strategy. All information needed by the transmitters is given by the fully cooperative payoff \alpha i = a n , the fully noncooperative payoff \delta i = b n f (n), and the coefficient p of the control function.
We now provide a simulation of the system evolution with the saturated strategy in the case of n = 4 transmitters, with a = 4, b = 12, and f (d) = n n + 5d , leading to \alpha i = 1 and \delta i = 0.5. Table 1 shows the payoffs for both narrowband and broadband transmitters as a function of the fraction of narrowband transmitters. When the transmitters decide their behavior based on the saturated strategy with p = 5, their payoff evolution is shown in Figure 4 . Starting from the randomly taken initial condition x(0) = [1.4449 0.2997 1.3192 1.0372] \top , as expected, the four transmitters converge to the cooperative point \= x \alpha = [1 1 1 1] \top . However, at time t = 10 the first transmitter switches to broadband mode and starts defecting, u 9. Concluding discussion. We have studied diffusion of cooperation among selfish players in a problem modeled as a repeated n-player prisoner's dilemma in continuous time. For the same model, we have provided an interpretation as an n-population game involving at each time n random individuals, one from each population. We have shown that the game can be turned into a positive dynamical system, and we have proposed a parameterized strategy that enforces cooperation for suitable values of the parameter. The strategy is original, as it builds on minimum knowledge on the part of the players, and has an explicit expression that allows us to provide convergence proofs, exploiting Lyapunov methods and Metzler matrix theory.
Future work includes (i) extending the analysis to heterogeneous populations, which use the strategy with different parameters (different level of patience or farsightedness); (ii) studying the coevolving network and its stability, as well as connections with random networks, scale free networks, and small world networks; and (iii) investigating different scenarios that involve neutral players in addition to cooperators and defectors, and where players can transition across the three categories in accordance to controlled or uncontrolled transition rates.
Results from the above settings can be then applied to different domains, including (i) cybersecurity with distributed detection and counterattack strategies, (ii) demand side management in which the consumers (players) adopt different levels of responsiveness to cooperation, and (iii) coalitional aggregation of power producers, in which the producers (players) may opt to cooperate and join coalitions; they can then sign contracts with an aggregator that is responsible for managing production schedule and cash flow from and to the producers.
